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A

Budget Policy
and Fiscal Crisis

Francis

J.

Politica

Matrix

Leaz.es, Jr.

Robert Sieczkiewicz

A

Rhode Island programs, administered during the state's budget crisis in
the fiscal years 1987 to 1991, yielded a number of important lessons. The more mandated formula spending there was in a budget, the more uncontrollable was the budget.
There is a spending bias ingrained in the political culture. Some nonentitlement spending can be difficult to curtail. Cutback management strategies are inadequate to address
study of 134

significant revenue shortfalls.

The authors present a political budget matrix designed

to

budget policymakers and staff in making educated assumptions about the way categories of programs may be treated during times of severe fiscal stress. The matrix takes
into account such elements as formulas, labor intensity, and position on the political

assist

agenda.

What a revolting development!" declared Riley, the beloved 1950s television character,

as he faced yet another family

dilemma.

He summed up

the feelings of north-

eastern state legislators and their budget staffs as they struggle with endless red ink.

Tough choices continue
Budgeting

makers and

is

to face the

a political act.

lawmakers

—

cut spending and/or raise taxes.

Our budgetary matrix

is

designed to help budget policy-

make educated assumptions, perhaps even forecasts, about the way
fiscal stress. The matrix can also assist in

staffs

programs may be treated during periods of

understanding the degree to which incrementalism remains

And,

to assess the results

of decremental budgeting,

it

in

place during fiscal

determines whether the budget

produces marginal downward spending adjustments or a more fundamental
resources from one program to another.

We

used the budgetary results for

Island programs for fiscal years 1987-1991 to develop the matrix.

having a more than $1 million appropriation in
of

all state

of

FY

of

34 Rhode

With each program

made up 95

percent

1991-1992.
that

have universal applicability for state-level budget policy-

makers emerged from the analysis. The
budgeting

literature: the

more uncontrollable

Francis

1991, the total

1

shift

spending. The matrix subsequently was used to assess the budget outcomes

Four general lessons

in

FY

crisis.

J.

Leaz.es.

Jr.,

first is

not new, having been discussed

more mandated formula spending under

the budget.

1

A

budget that

is

associate professor of political science,

length

current law, the

heavily entitled cannot be readily
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Island Master of Public Administration Program. Robert Sieczkiewicz
Island state legislature.
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at

is

College,

is

Rhode
Rhode

director of the

principal budget analyst,

Atevr
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The
budget is vulnerable because, when appropriations are left open-ended to accommodate
formula requirements and cost of living adjustments, the government becomes less able
to respond to unfavorable revenue forecasts and economic projections.
adjusted nor can outlays be controlled through the annual appropriations process.

Another key lesson, also not new,

is that

a clear governmental spending bias

2

grained in the political culture. That bias remains in place in times of fiscal

when

political

"no new taxes" promises have reduced a

In this study of five fiscal years,

tlement expenditures, occurred

—

talism

more than half

at rates

is in-

even

crisis,

state's revenue-raising capacity.

the state's spending, including nonenti-

exceeding any reasonable definition of incremen-

the habitual small, upward-creeping tendencies of budgets so often associated

with public budgeting^

Rhode

Island's spending continued unabated throughout the

early years of the fiscal crisis.

The

third lesson is that nonentitlement

agenda, and

in

which there

it

can be

difficult to control

more nonentitlement programs can be

ing, far

The

is

However, while

trol as entitlements.

programs which are high on the

fourth lesson

is

political

significant political elite involvement, are as hard to con-

that short-term

address significant revenue shortfalls.

4

nonentitlement spend-

cut.

cutback strategies are woefully inadequate to

Our

analysis begins with this

last,

but important

point.

Traditional cutback

Once

management techniques were

dutifully used to address the crisis.

these tough-choice avoidance strategies were exhausted, policymakers turned to

program reductions. The matrix describes succinctly the outcomes of

their eventual

choices.

The

Political

Rhode

Island

Response

was a victim of

vices during the 1980s.
treasury with

spending

to the

new

A

Emerging Budget

its

own

Crisis

success in raising revenues and expanding ser-

sudden early-to-mid-decade boom economy flooded the

revenues. Yet state government spending outpaced

initiatives

blossomed (see Table

1).

The governor and

its

state

revenues as

legislature

showed no

inclination to restrain their largess during that period.

Table

1

Comparing Revenues and Expenditures
Fiscal Years 1986-1990
Fiscal

Year

General

Percentage

Revenue

Change

(in

1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

General
Expenditures

000,000s)

1,022.6
1,165.8
1,247.9
1,293.2
1,374.0

(in

3.6
6.3

1,489.7

7.0

Change

000,000s)

1,052.4
1,130.9
1,255.7
1,399.7

14.0

Percentage

7.5

11.0
11.5
6.4

Source: State of Rhode Island, Department of Administration, budgets as enacted for the appropriate year.
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The boom years also witnessed an increase
Rhode Island's tax power is historically below
is

in the state's

the national average, but

often above the national average (see Figure

reduced

its

tax effort

by enacting a

"piggyback" on the federal

tax.

By

1).

series of rate reductions in its

1988,

at

on tax capacity and

that point

its

tax effort

During the mid-1980s Rhode Island

income

tax,

which

is

a

the outset of the fiscal crisis, the state's tax

capacity and effort were approaching the national norms.

from

revenue-raising capacity.

As Figure

1

clearly shows,

effort diverged sharply, a direct result

of the

fiscal

crisis.

Figure

1

Rhode

Island Tax Capacity

and

Effort

1979-1991
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Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, "1991 State Fiscal Capacity and Effort"
(Washington, D.C.: ACIR, August 1993).

Underlying the apparently healthy 1980s economy were troubling indicators pointing
to the

boom's

really being a "blip."

Policymakers ignored forecast data warning of

future trouble. Single-housing permit applications,
cators of the robustness of the state's overall
after their

clearly

peak

in

1986 (see Figure

2).

which are consistently

economic

cited as indi-

health, declined precipitously

Despite a number of lesser peaks, the trend was

downward. The warning sign went unheeded, however.

State spending continued

to grow.

Other ominous signposts appeared

ceeded unabated through
throughout the

last

increase. Rising

were able

fiscal

in the

years following, but state spending pro-

years 1988 and 1989.

The prime lending

rate rose

few years of the decade. Rhode Island housing prices continued

mortgage

rates

and housing prices meant

that

to

fewer Rhode Islanders

home. After peaking in 1988, housing sales declined rapidly.
By fiscal 1989-1990, significant political capital had accrued to both the legislature
and governor because state income tax rates were reduced four times between 1986 and
to afford a
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1988. All the while revenues continued to rise. However,
reluctantly cashed in this political capital to

overcome

Rhode

Island officeholders

fiscal stress

once revenues began

to decline.

Figure 2

Rhode

Island Housing Permits

1986-1991
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The Cutback Management Response
Once

the state's budget began to bleed in fiscal year 1988-1989,

and hemorrhaged be-

tween 1990 and 1992, past spending commitments were threatened. The gap between
the needs

and expectations of citizens and government employees for public services

and benefits widened. The economy could not generate enough growth
tax supported

to sustain

programs without putting unacceptable demands on taxpayers. The new

federalism, a seeming "shift and shaft," continued to strain the state coffers.

Tough choices faced

the

Rhode

Island legislature as

it

struggled to meet the state

constitution's balanced budget requirement. Repeatedly, state revenues did not

forecasted expectations. Fiscal year 1989-1990
deficit

$200

on a

total state

budget of about $1.49

saw

billion.

meet

emergence of an $86.8 million
Fiscal 1990-1991 realized a nearly

the

million shortfall.

In mid-decade, policymakers
financial

emergency

plan. In

had taken a few tentative steps toward developing a

1984 the legislators created a "rainy day" fund, the State

Budget Reserve and Cash Stabilization Account. When the first deficit appeared
1989-1990, the $57 million in that account was depleted almost overnight.

The

initial political

response of the Rhode Island legislature and governor

in

in the de-

1989-1990 and 1990-1991 was to combine traditional
cutback management techniques with revenue "enhancements" and a small personal income tax increased Any major increases in personal or corporate income tax rates were
clining revenue years of fiscal

not

deemed

politically possible as both

new-taxes pledge. Nevertheless, the

governors

in office

during the crisis took the no-

state's tax effort increased
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while

its

capacity began

to decrease as a recession

management
program was

began

to take hold.

During 1989-1990,

traditional cutback

strategies to reduce personnel costs took center stage.

An

early retirement

More than 700 state employees took advantage of an offer
The expected short-term savings were offset somewhat by per-

put in place.

"they couldn't refuse."

sonnel's rehiring under the state seventy-five-day rule or as consultants. Shifting state-

revenue-supported employees to federal "soft money" also became a strategy of choice.
In fiscal year

1990-1991, revenue enhancements came

gap between tax capacity and
•

effort.

The

to the forefront, furthering the

principal steps taken

were

to:

increase user fees for motor vehicle registration and other services, including the

beloved vanity license plates;

•

enact a state sunset sales tax increase that raised the tax from 6 to 7 percent, to be

phased out over the two subsequent years;
•

•

expand the

sales tax to incorporate periodicals;

increase the state "sin" taxes on alcohol and tobacco as well as the gasoline tax;
the latter

was increased twice

in

one

year, placing

it

among

the highest in

the nation;

•

cancel the one percent Public Service Corporation tax reduction scheduled for

FY
•

1991;

employ

creative accounting to define

when and how

certain receivables

would be

reported.

Structural changes in the activities supporting the budget process appeared as well.

During the
staff

last

and the

few

hope

revenue and spending forecasts of the governor's

legislative fiscal advisers

casting techniques.
state's

fiscal years the

To

iron

them

were often

out, a revenue-estimating

budget officer and the House and Senate

that their

None of
for the

in conflict

because of different fore-

conference

fiscal advisers

combined strengths would improve the
fall

produce a $200 million

shortfall,

in the

6

1990-1991 kept changing

new governor was sworn into
FY 1990-1991 budget as enacted was projected to

of 1990.

office in January 1991, the original

By

was established

quality of forecasts.

the strategies worked. Forecasted expenditures for

worse throughout the

made up of the

the time a

excluding the cost of a looming statewide credit union

bailout.

emerged during FY 1990-1991,
the new governor proposed a midyear adjusted budget package that the legislature
quickly passed. The new strategy for coping with fiscal disaster was primarily designed
to reduce payroll. The governor proposed and negotiated a ten-day pay deferral plan
with state worker and college faculty unions that included an additional nineteen salary
deferral days in the following fiscal year. Over 500 layoffs in a state work force of
approximately 18,000 were ordered. The state's contribution to the State Teacher's
Retirement Fund was deferred.
Unfortunately, fiscal 1991-1992 was no better. Almost immediately the governor had
to submit a budget containing the already negotiated pay deferrals and a continuation

When

the potential long-term severity of the crisis
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of the retirement fund strategy. Increases in the personal income tax, however, were off
the political table.

Reducing program spending took the spotlight

A

Matrix

Budget

Politics

Programs are never equal
duced likelihood of

in the

competition for

"fair share" increases to

finite

— and

continues.

and shrinking resources. The

actual cuts in an agency's budget base, even if seemingly decremental ones,

getary competition fierce.

re-

cover future costs of current services, or

The contest becomes even more

intense

when

makes bud-

large portions

of the state budget are uncontrollable, whether because of mandated formulas or rough-

and-tumble "politics."
Partisans strive to assure that their programs receive their fair share, a "fairness fac-

measured here by the percentage increase above or below the median growth rate
all programs. For all programs it was an aggregate 37.9 percent over the five years

tor"

for

of the study or roughly 7.5 percent each year. This occurred despite the Rhode Island
governor's having, by statute, to

recommend

to the legislature a

budget not to exceed

5.5 percent of the previous year's enacted budget.

There

is

also a track record with regard to programs' winning their budget share.

This "win-lose" account

measured by whether a program's

is

rate

of budgetary growth

remained steady or was interrupted during the five-year period. Interrupted growth

means

that a

growth

in

program's budgetary history reflected a pattern of above or below median

one year, followed by a subsequent year of no growth or decline, then a sub-

sequent upward rebound and such.

Table 2 presents a budget politics matrix that explains programs' relative budget success or failure in protecting their base and obtaining a fair share.

Each

cell

has a label

reflecting the success or failure experienced over the five years of the study:
ners, Sprinters, Steady Plodders,

Knowing whether
ing five criteria

and Big Losers.

a program wins or loses

characteristics associated with

its fair

winning or losing

commonly found

Big Win-

in the public

is

share

is

helpful, but identifying the

also important.

We

chose the follow-

budgeting literature associated with

spending decisions to perform the analysis: (1) whether program spending was formula

mandated;
its

(2)

whether the program was labor intensive, with more than 70 percent of

dollars having

been allotted to personnel costs; 7

the state's political

action

is

(3) a

program's gaining a place on

agenda — such access requires widespread

required, and a public perception that the matter

is

attention, a

concern that

appropriate for govern-

9

ment; (4) the level of political advocacy for a program; and (5) the degree to which the
8

program was a product of a special interest of an individual lawmaker or group of legisthose who have adequate political
lators that do not constitute a major voting bloc

—

capital to invest in the continuation of their "pet projects." Table 3
ical characteristics

of each

summarizes the

polit-

cell.

Analysis

Between 1987 and 1991, when the

crisis

emerged and

the budget subsequently

rhaged, a spending bias generally continued to manifest

grams expanded

at rates

above the median growth

cent of total state spending.

76

rate,

itself.

Half of

all

hemor-

the pro-

accounting for nearly 60 per-

Table 2

Rhode Island State Spending: Fiscal Years 1987-1991
Fairness Factor and Win-Lose Record (Programs = 134)
Win-Lose Record

Steady Growth

Cell

c

I

Interrupted

- Big Winners

Cell

23%
33%

31 Total programs
Total spending

03

t5

Formula spending
28 Nonformula programs
Nonformula spending

>
O
J2

<

- Sprinters

36 Total programs
Total spending
7 Formula programs
Formula spending
29 Nonformula programs
Nonformula spending

3%

3 Formula programs
<D

II

Growth

23%
20%
10%

27%
25%
5%
13%
22%
12%

Nonformula Summary

5%

7 Labor-int. programs
Labor-int. spending

O
LL

15%

20 Multivar. programs
Multivar. spending
1

O

9%

Pet program
Pet spending

7%
2%

9 Labor-int. programs
Labor-int. spending
14 Multivar. programs
Multivar. spending

.2%

11%

9%
4%

6 Pet programs
Pet spending

.7%
.4%

1%

<fl

(0

o

C

Cell

(0

III

-

Cell IV - Big Losers

Steady Plodders

'3
LL
c
CO

9%

12 Total program

spending
2 Formula programs
Formula spending
10 Nonformula programs
Nonformula spending
Total

_o
CD

CO

41%
27%

55 Total programs
Total spending

10%

1%

7%
7%

9 Formula programs

2%
7%
8%

Formula spending
46 Nonformula programs
Nonformula spending

34%
20%

6%
7%

38 Labor-int. programs
Labor-int. spending

28%
18%

.5%
.7%
.5%
.3%

6 Multivar. program

Nonformula Summary
8 Labor-int.

progams

spending
Multivar. program
Multivar. spending
Labor-int.

1

1

Pet Program
Pet spending

Note:

I

Rhode

2 Pet programs
Pet spending

of total programs. Spending percentage: of
on agenda; high advocacy.

Big Winners
contains the true uncontrollables

—

the

Big Winners

that

5%
2%

spending

Program percentage:

Multivar. = in crisis; high

Cell

Multivar.

made up 33

1%
.2%

total

spending.

percent of

Island state spending. During 1987-1991 these programs

exceeding the 7.5 percent median growth rate for

77

all

grew at rates far
programs. The degree to which

a
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Table 3

Political Matrix of

Cell

I

Budget Control

- Big Winners

Cell

II

- Sprinters

Uncontrollable

Difficult to control

Much entitlement spending
Low labor intensity

Some

High

High visibility/often

visibility/often in

agenda item
Strong advocacy
Broad

crisis/high

Individual elites

elites

pets

Cell

III

Many

- Steady Plodders

Controllable
Little entitlement spending
Labor intensive

entitlement spending

Labor intensive

Low visibility
No crisis
Low agenda item

Low visibility
No crisis
Low agenda item
Weak advocacy
No elites
Few pets

Some advocacy
Coalitions
Few pets

budget can be controlled and adjusted

pets

Cell IV - Big Losers

Incrementalism
Little

in

agenda item
Strong advocacy

crisis/high

Few

entitlement spending
labor intensity

Low

in

times of fiscal stress depends on keeping the

amount of Big Winner spending to a minimum. Cutting the Big Winner programs,
that is, moving them out of the uncontrollable arena, is difficult because such an action

may have
that the

a perceived or real long-term electoral impact on the legislature, or require

problem be "solved" or redefined

in

some way.

Two-thirds of Rhode Island Big Winner entitlement spending derived from the
cally sensitive, formula-driven State Support for

gram, which accounts for about 20 percent of
annual rate of nearly

1 1

politi-

Local School Operations. That pro-

all state

percent over the five years.

spending, grew

at

an average

10

Nonentitlement Big Winners are high-visibility programs, sometimes in

have generated broad coalitions to support spending. The

crisis, that

state's consistent nonentitle-

ment Big Winner policy areas were mental health programs and corrections. Six percent
total state spending in fiscal 1990 was for mental health services.
The Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals (MHRH) deinstitutionalization effort was the prime beneficiary. For example, the Mental Retardation Com-

of

munity Services Program, Community Mental Health Program, Community Mental
Health Plan, and Mental Health Services for Children grew

at

average annual rates

of 22 percent, 18 percent, 10 percent, and 44 percent, respectively.

Rhode

Island's correctional system was, until recently, in crisis.

under a federal

district court

tional Institute.

The

order to reduce overcrowding

facilities unit

The

at the state

state

operated

Adult Correc-

received an increase of 74 percent over the five

years to help alleviate the strain. With the public's view of the need for increased public
safety, corrections fared well.
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Sprinters

The Sprinters

tasted the thrill of victory

— growth

rates

above the median, sometimes

agony of defeat — years when spending increases

They also knew the
fell well below the median or declined. These programs waffle between being highly
visible, crisis oriented, and less visible "pets." Most of them are nonentitlement programs that account for half the spending in the category. As with Big Winners, fewer
Sprinter entitlements make up half the spending in this category. The state's share of
Medicaid is a Sprinter because of factors such as the unemployment rate during that
significantly so.

period.

The

Sprinters are on the Big

because they have

trol

many

Winner

political waiting

They

list.

legislative advocates. Yet they

are difficult to con-

have not developed or sus-

tained a broad enough coalition to garner large, consistent increases in their budget, or
to stave off cuts. The significant increases they do receive cluster in years when they

receive special attention.
If they

experience a highly visible

period. For example, the

Rhode

been roundly criticized for

its

The deaths of children,

ago.

performance ever since

its

creation

more than

a decade

allegations of staff misconduct, and other assorted
in crisis.

spending when the complaints reach

community

they sprint ahead budgetarily for a short

Island Department for Children and Their Families has

plaints have kept the department

for

crisis,

The

political

crisis proportion.

So over

the five years, spending

by 13 percent,

services for children has increased

percent, and the board and care of children in private

com-

response has been to increase

homes by

direct services

by 9

8 percent.

At the opposite end of the Sprinter spectrum are those programs which forge ahead
precisely because they are not highly visible but have strong legislative advocates.
Being a "pet" can help keep growth

rates

against periodic cuts. Programs such as

above the median, but

Community

that is

no insurance

Service Grants, Pathways to Inde-

pendence, and Alternative Care for the Elderly have grown

at

above median rates

in a

couple of years, but have experienced no growth in others during the same five-year
period.

One

key, then, to control of spending

is

to

keep Sprinters from acquiring Big

Winner status, either by solving their problems or by keeping individual program advocates from developing broader support.
Steady Plodders

The

striking characteristic of the Steady Plodders is their

classic incremental
state

low number. Rhode Island's

growth pool of programs has shrunk, totaling only 10 percent of

spending and about 9 percent of the programs. They grew

at

a consistent annual 5

percent rate over five years, staying within the budget cap and below the median. These

Steady Plodders are institutionalized, mostly labor intensive, rarely in

Only two

the political agenda.

The Steady Plodders
fabric of the state.
ical

is

and low on

are formula based.

are valued, but not visible,

There

crisis,

somewhat woven

into the political

general agreement that they are a product of past polit-

decisions and ought not to be greatly tinkered with. However, those which are labor

intensive teeter

on the brink of becoming Big Losers.

mental growth of the

whose budget grew

MHRH-run

at

A classic

General Hospital, which

is

example

is

the incre-

highly labor intensive and

a rate of just under 5 percent.

Big Losers

The Big Losers

are controllable. Little apparent political

79

"blame"

is

assessed as a result
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of their being cut. Although there
these policy areas, the extent of

is

no question

commitment

be high on the political agenda, are not

may no
among them.

longer be

advocates

is

that

open

government ought

legislature.

be involved

in

The programs may not

to debate.

in sensitive crisis policy areas,

members of the

to

and

their political

There are virtually no pets

Because they are labor intensive and may have the capacity

to raise their

own

rev-

enue, these programs provide the best opportunity for immediate savings. Forty-one

percent of the 134 programs are labor intensive. Nearly 70 percent of

programs are Big Losers, but the

fifty-five

all

labor-intensive

of them account for only 18 percent of state

spending.

One major
most

visible

to "raise"

policy area reflecting the Big Loser syndrome

and

largest of

own

its

all.

A

labor-intensive policy area,

is

higher education, the

it

has the perceived ability

revenues, a quality of dubious value in times of

crisis.

Rhode

Island

support for higher education has dropped from nearly 80 percent of higher education

revenues in 1987 to about 50 percent by

Many Big Loser programs
typically have virtually

FY

1992.

typically offer a political advantage as well because they

no advocates.

Many

of them are related to central managerial

functions such as auditing, inspecting, and purchasing. These programs have experi-

enced budget decrements

in their base.

Eventually, the Big Loser portion of the budget could shrink to relative insignifi-

cance.

The

state will then

be forced to determine whether

any of the current programs

it

should continue to finance

in that category. In higher education, the three state institu-

tions are better characterized as state assisted rather than state supported. In other areas,

government would have
choice unless

it

wanted

to

to

abandon some general operations, a
go out of business entirely.

clearly impractical

1991-1992 Outcomes

The matrix proved
1992, which in the

useful in tracking the results for programs during fiscal year 1991
five previous years

real cuts did take place.

percent —

had

fallen into

The median "growth"

each of the four

rate for all

a sign of the truly desperate budget situation.

—

cells. Overall,

programs was a negative 9.7
It

would be expected

that the

Big Winners and Steady Plodders would fare best under these draconian conditions.
Conversely, Sprinters would not be able to sprint, and Big Losers would teeter on the

edge of extinction. For the most

While

all

were borne

out.

categories of programs suffered cuts, the Big Winners and Steady Plodders

of the five previous

more

part, expectations

fiscal

years were able to fend off cuts or minimize their losses

effectively than the Sprinters

maintaining a positive growth rate

and Big Losers.
in the

We

defined budget effectiveness as

budget enacted for

FY

1991-1992. Programs

minimized losses when funded at their FY 1991 level or when the cuts they
sustained were less than the median reduction of 9.7 percent. Those whose cuts were

realized

greater than that took the "big hits."

Big Winners and Steady Plodders enjoyed protection from major budget

grams

in

cuts. Pro-

both categories continued to grow and to avoid serious cuts more effectively

than Sprinters and Big Losers. Better than half the Big Losers continued to suffer losses

The safest programs
in difficult budget times are entitlements. Almost 50 percent of them continued to grow
and another quarter minimized losses. The pay deferrals and layoffs are reflected in the

greater than the median, and the Sprinters did not sprint that year.
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labor-intensive programs, of

which nearly two-thirds had

to

absorb significant cuts.

Recommendations

As

Rhode

a result of using the matrix and piecing together the history of the

get crisis,

we determined

looms when,

that fiscal trouble

economic

•

government

•

small revenue enhancements and cutback

officials ignore early

coping with declining

ical strategy for

•

state

in

Island bud-

tandem,

stress indicators;

management becomes

the principal polit-

state tax receipts;

government spending programs during good economic times are characterized

by new or expanded entitlements and

result in a large part of a state's

budget

becoming uncontrollable;
entitlement and nonentitlement spending continues to

•

grow even

after a fiscal crisis

arises.

When

cutback management strategies appear as solutions to potentially major

must be prepared to argue for a more aggressive approach to
hemorrhage. Although cutback advocates have recognized the problem,

problems, budget
avert a likely

fiscal

staffs

making the longer-term choices more diffinot pay for the above-median growth rate of programs.

they are only forestalling tough decisions,

Administrative savings will

cult.

The premise supporting the matrix is that the ability to foresee severe budgetary
stress comes from watching political behavior and understanding past political decisionsem-bedded in the budget. In Rhode Island, incremental growth continued for some
programs and agencies throughout the

crisis

because they are

in the entitlement classifi-

cation and therefore high on the political agenda. Budget controllability shrinks in pro-

Winner and Sprinter categories. The Steady Plodders,
move onward almost unnoticed. Decrements appeared for a

portion to the growth of these Big
like the proverbial tortoise,

few entitlements, but were
inevitably, are felt

by

ations of government

capacity
shifts

may

felt

mostly by nonentitlement programs. Decrements, almost

relatively low-spending, labor-intensive, less-visible, general oper-

—

the Big Losers.

Programs with a separate revenue-raising

find their state appropriation cut.

from nonentitlement

Spending as a percentage of the

total

to entitlement programs, further increasing the potential un-

controllability of state spending.

Our matrix ought
shift.

ers,

Budget

staffs

to

be viewed as a guide, one that can change just as politics can

ought to track regularly which programs are Big Winners, Sprint-

Steady Plodders, and Big Losers. Programs

and lose

stable or institutionalized, acquire advocates,

program can, over time,

shift

from one

fall in

cell to another.

and out of

crisis,

their visibility.

The matrix

is

become more

Consequently a
a useful tool for

assessing the overall composition of those changes, namely, to determine the degree to

which a budget becomes uncontrollable. Because each

state is unique,

have to be spent developing those characteristics which address a

some time

state's

own

will

political

environment.

Undoubtedly, budget choices are

difficult

legislators to cut services or raise taxes.

and complex. There

Our general conclusion
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is little

is

incentive for

not revolutionary.

New England Journal

It

of Public Policy

takes political will to bring spending under control, and that appears only after

all

cut-

back strategies have been exhausted. Legislators cannot wave a magic wand, nor can
their

budget

staffs "click"

ments" disappear.

&

with a computer mouse to

make

these "revolting develop-
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